Space Over Statistic, Retraining Over Ranking: Auditing Training Labels Under Label-Only Backdoors
FLIP only changes labels: on CIFAR-10, flipping 3% of them makes a ResNet-32 send 99.7% of triggered source-class images to the attacker's class.
ProofPaper ↗
Key points
- Some backdoor attacks never touch an image.
- The usual defenses look for the poison inside a model trained on those same labels.
- On dog$\to$cat the same nearest-neighbor check scores AUROC 0.546 on the poisoned model's features, 0.967 on frozen DINOv2 features that never saw a label, and 0.995 on the same network trained on clean labels, an oracle control rather than a defense.
- We reproduce SPECTRE, the defense FLIP's authors recommend, to 90.94 / 0.97 against its published 91.47 / 1.7, then price it: on truck$\to$deer it deletes 20% of every class, while a prototype audit on the frozen features deletes 6% for higher clean accuracy and lower attack success.
Sources (1)
- [1]Space Over Statistic, Retraining Over Ranking: Auditing Training Labels Under Label-Only BackdoorsarXiv (AI, ML, NLP, CV, robotics, multi-agent) · Oct 9, 06:05 AM
FLIP only changes labels: on CIFAR-10, flipping 3% of them makes a ResNet-32 send 99.7% of triggered source-class images to the attacker's class.
Some backdoor attacks never touch an image.
Extractive summary: sentences quoted from the sources.
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