Refusal Is Not Robustness: Measuring Harmful Reachability in Autoregressive Language Models
LLM safety evaluations via jailbreaking typically index on attack success rate (ASR): whether a generated response violates safeguards.
ProofPaper ↗
Key points
- Autoregressive language models define distributions over possible outputs, and a sampled refusal can coexist with substantial probability mass on harmful generation paths.
- We study this hidden structure through bounded continuation analysis (BCA), which models autoregressive generation as a stochastic process over token prefixes and computes the finite-horizon probability that generation reaches a harmful continuation.
- BCA constructs a bounded continuation tree, labels terminal continuations with a semantic harm evaluator, and estimates harmful reachability using exact probabilistic model checking.
- Across four instruction-tuned LLMs and 100 JailbreakBench behaviors, we show that BCA effectively quantifies hidden harmful behavior and provides a useful signal to guide red teaming.
Sources (1)
- [1]Refusal Is Not Robustness: Measuring Harmful Reachability in Autoregressive Language ModelsarXiv (AI, ML, NLP, CV, robotics, multi-agent) · Oct 15, 11:45 PM
LLM safety evaluations via jailbreaking typically index on attack success rate (ASR): whether a generated response violates safeguards.
Autoregressive language models define distributions over possible outputs, and a sampled refusal can coexist with substantial probability mass on harmful generation paths.
Extractive summary: sentences quoted from the sources.
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