Policy Is Not Capability: Some Safety Benchmarks Measure Which Definition of "Unsafe" You Trained On
A guardrail classifier is reported as if unsafe were a property of text.
ProofPaper ↗
Key points
- It is not: it is a property of a policy, and the policy enters the model through its labels.
- First, the guardrail's own training corpus already contained the benchmarks: JailbreakBench-benign is 88% and OR-Bench-hard 82% present in the training pools, two over-refusal benchmarks, the kind a guardrail reports to argue it does not over-block.
- Second, safety benchmarks stratify sharply by how much of their score is decided by the label definition rather than by the model: with architecture and optimiser fixed, the range across the ten arms is 0.99 on HarmBench-copyright and 0.043 on WildGuard-benign, a 23x spread.
- For a distilled student the teacher's soft labels do this even when every hard label carries the other policy, so teacher provenance is an unrecorded confound in any released checkpoint.
Sources (2)
- [1]Policy Is Not Capability: Some Safety Benchmarks Measure Which Definition of "Unsafe" You Trained OnHugging Face Daily Papers · Oct 18, 12:00 AM
A guardrail classifier is reported as if unsafe were a property of text.
It is not: it is a property of a policy, and the policy enters the model through its labels.
- [2]Policy Is Not Capability: Some Safety Benchmarks Measure Which Definition of "Unsafe" You Trained OnarXiv (AI, ML, NLP, CV, robotics, multi-agent) · Oct 18, 07:02 AM · same content
Extractive summary: sentences quoted from the sources.
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